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I. INTRODUCTION

Although in many ways technology has made the practice of law easier,
the vast increases in storage capacity, the lightning-quick speed of
communication, and the ability to transmit data over the Internet have
made it more important for lawyers to consider the impact of technology
on the core ethical issue of confidentiality. Digitalization of the practice
of law means that a breach of a duty of confidentiality can have far greater
consequences because greater amounts of information can be transmitted
at lightning speeds. Where once it would have taken a truck and an army
of burglars to steal an important but voluminous file, today that
information can be attached to a single e-mail. The ethical duty remains
the same, but the consequences differ and the precise acts needed to
protect client confidentially involve the use of new technology and
uncertain or even unknown risks.
This Article describes how lawyers can meet their obligation of
confidentiality when dealing with e-mail transmission.1 It updates articles
written by David Hricik more than six years ago 2 - eons in the Internet
1. There are many other issues that the use of e-mail create. For example, it may be
necessary to delete e-mail on an ISP in order to ensure that the e-mail remains within the scope of
the federal wiretap statutes. See generallyDaniel J. Solove, DataPrivacyandthe VanishingFourth
Amendment, 29 CHAMPION 20 (May 2005) (explaining that the Department of Justice believes that
read, but not deleted, e-mails are exempt from those laws).
2. See David Hricik, Confidentiality & Privilegein High-Tech Communications,60 TEX.
BUS. J. 104 (1997); Lawyers Worry Too Much About TransmittingClient Confidences by Internet
E-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459 (1998).
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age - that became widely cited in support of the proposition that e-mail
was secure for purposes of attorney-client communications.3 Since those
articles were published, a few authors have agreed with his conclusions,'
while others have not.' Indeed, a very recent piece notes that the
foundation for the conclusion that e-mail was safe to use has been called
into question by a subsequent First Circuit decision. In a rather Quixotic
fashion, this Article presents a very careful inquiry into the factual risks
and an analysis of the legal protections associated with e-mail, with the
hope of ending this debate.

II. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CLIENT CONFIDENCES

There are two forms of inadvertent e-mail transmission. One occurs
when a lawyer inadvertently includes as a recipient an unintended name.7
The availability of xerography and proliferation of facsimile machines and
electronic mail make it more likely that through inadvertence, privileged
or confidential materials will be sent to opposing counsel by no more than
the pushing of the wrong speed dial number on a facsimile machine.8
Lawyers must take reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent

3. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility Formal Op. 99-413 (1999);
Sup. Ct. Ohio Bd. Comm'rs. on Grievances & Discipline OH Adv. Op. 99-2 (1999); Pa. B. Ass'n.
Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Resp. Informal Op. No. 97-130 (1997); Ill. St. B. Ass'n. Advisory
Op. on Prof I Conduct No. 96-10 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Sean M. O'Brien, Extending the Attorney-ClientPrivilege:Do Internet E-mail
Communications Warrant a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 4 SuFFoLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 187 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Micalyn S. Harris, E-MailPrivacy:An Oxymoron, 78 NEB. L. REV. 386 (1999).
6. See Yvette Joy Liebesman, The PotentialEffects of United States v. Councilman on the
Confidentialityof Attorney-Client E-mail Communications, 18 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHics 893 (2005).
Infra text accompanying notes 107-12.
7. The ABA recently mentioned inadvertent transmission of e-mail when analyzing waiver
of privilege over a misdirected fax: "the availability of xerography and proliferation of facsimile
machines and electronic mail make it technologically ever more likely that through inadvertence,
privileged or confidential materials will be produced to opposing counsel by no more than the
pushing of the wrong speed dial number on a facsimile machine." ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof 1Responsibility Formal Op. 92-368 (1992). AccordFla.St. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof I Ethics
Op. 93-3 (1994) (stating that "Such an inadvertent disclosure might occur as part of a document
production, a misdirected facsimile or electronic mail transmission, a 'switched envelope' mailing,
or misunderstood distribution list instructions.").
8. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992). AccordFla.
St. Bar. Assn. Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics Op. 93-3 (1994) ("Such an inadvertent disclosure might
occur as part of a document production, a misdirected facsimile or electronic mail transmission, a
"switched envelope" mailing, or misunderstood distribution list instructions.").
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transmission of confidential information to third parties, and especially
opposing counsel. 9 For example, some firms have policies that prohibit
lawyers and staff from having opposing counsels' fax numbers or e-mail
addresses stored in any automatically accessible way (such as in an
address book on a mail program or a speed dial button on a fax machine).
Inadvertent disclosure of privileged information can waive the privilege,
or if not, it can let the cat out of the bag.'l However, that aspect is not the
focus of this Article.
The second common form of inadvertent transmission occurs when the
message is sent only to its intended recipients, but it is sent in a way that
permits third parties to review - that is, electronically eavesdrop on the information. Depending on the technology, e-mail can create the risk
of eavesdropping. This circumstance is the focus of this Article.
III. THE NATURE OF DUTY OF CARE

Most states have rules based on ABA Model Rule 1.6, which requires
lawyers to maintain all information relating to the representation of a client
in confidence, with narrow exceptions. l" This aspect of the duty of
9. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 17 (2003) ("When transmitting a
communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must
take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended
recipients.").
10. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (inadvertently disclosing privileged
information waives the privilege); but see Georgetown Manor v. Ethan Allen Corp., 753 F. Supp.
936 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (inadvertent disclosure can never waive privilege); see also Alldread v. City
of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993) (inadvertent disclosure can sometimes waive privilege).
11. As recently amended by the ABA, Model Rule 1.6 provides in full:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services;
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confidentiality is a duty of care: lawyers "must act competently to
safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against
,,12
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure ....
The duty is not one of strict liability or absolute care. 3 Instead, to
determine the appropriate level of care, lawyers are required to balance the
risk of harm and likelihood of breach:
This duty ...does not require that the lawyer use special security

measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may
warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality
include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which
the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a
confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to
implement special security measures not required by this Rule or
may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication
that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule. 4
Thus, in assessing whether e-mail is appropriate, lawyers must consider
the consequences to the client of loss of confidentiality, as well as the
likelihood of interception.
This Article addresses the second part of that equation: how likely is
it that interception occurs?

(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 16 (2003).
13. Were absolute security required, computers could not be used, since they emit radiation
that can be "intercepted" from afar. See http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Computer
Science/2002/vaneck.asp. Nor could lawyers talk on land-based phone lines, since they can be
tapped, or talk in their offices, since bugging is possible. See id. The possibility of interception is
not the issue.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.6, cmt. 16 (2003).
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IV. THE LIKELIHOOD OF EAVESDROPPING DEPENDS ON How E-MAIL
Is SENT

This section analyzes the risks associated with the different modes of
e-mail communication. E-mail can be sent in various ways, some of which
create greater risk than others. This section analyzes the security of various
modes of transmitting e-mail, starting with e-mail that does not traverse
the Internet, then turning to Internet-based e-mail communications.
A. Local Area Network Communications
1. The Risk of Eavesdropping
It is common for lawyers to transmit client confidences by e-mail on
"local area networks" or LANs.15 For example, in-house counsel often use
a corporation's internal e-mail system to communicate with their corporate
client. Likewise, lawyers in private practice transmit attorney-client
information relating to their clients within a law firm over similar closed
networks.
Communications which are sent only within a LAN never traverse the
Internet.' 6 In a sense, e-mail sent over a LAN is little different than a
memo delivered by a messenger from one lawyer to another within the
same firm. If anything, the e-mail is more secure.
2. Legal Protections
Every person who works in a law firm owes a duty of confidentiality
to all firm clients. 7 As a result, because e-mail sent over a LAN may be
potentially viewed by all firm employees, every person who may view
such information owes an obligation of confidentiality to the firm's clients.
Thus the duty of confidentiality is one legal protection afforded to LANbased e-mail.
In order for a third party to intercept a message on a LAN, the third
party would need to gain physical access to the premises and plant a
packet sniffer or other interception device on a vulnerable part of the

15. See generally PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WORKS, 11 (7th ed. 2004)
(describing operation of LANs).
16. Id.
17. Every person in a firm owes an obligation of confidentiality to each firm client. See
MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.0, 5.3 (2003).
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network. Absent consent, 8 such conduct is a trespass and is clearly
unlawful. Thus, civil and criminal laws protect LAN-based
communications as well.
3. Ethics Authorities
Two bar opinions expressly recognized that e-mail transmission wholly
within a LAN carries almost no risk of interception. The Illinois Bar
Association properly recognizes that "electronic messages that are carried
on a local area or private network may only be accessed from within the
organization owning the network," and so those "messages would
therefore clearly appear subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy." 9
The South Carolina Bar Association likewise recognized the inherently
secure nature of LANs:
Private networks operate on a system accessible only by other
computers on the same system (e.g., within the same office) ....
[M]essages sent from one computer go directly to another computer
with no stops in between. This type of communication has been
held to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy. Any
inadvertent transmission or intentional interception within a private
network would have no effect on confidentiality because all persons
with access to that network (i.e. law firm attorneys and employees)
owe a duty of confidentiality to all firm clients.2°

18. Firms that permit third parties to have access to internal networks for maintenance must
ensure that such third parties contractually agree to abide by the firm's duty of confidentiality. This
both avoids any argument of implied consent and establishes a legal duty of confidentiality.
Generally, a lawyer may use off-site storage facilities operated by third-parties, provided the lawyer
is reasonably assured that the facility will take reasonable precautions to maintain confidentiality.
However, no federal law protects these files. See N.C. Eth. Op. 209 (1996) ("[A] lawyer should
store a client's file in a secure location where client confidentiality can be maintained."); N.Y. Eth.
Op. 643 (1993) ("We also see no ethical impropriety in storing closed files ...so long as client
confidences.., are protected from unauthorized disclosure. The files should be stored in a secure
location and should be available only to the client, the client's present or former lawyer, or another
with the client's informed consent.") (citation omitted); Mich. Eth. OP. RI-100 (1991) (lawyer may
"[s]tore client representation files and other law firm files which are not to be destroyed in a facility
which protects client confidences and secrets, safekeeps property, and complies with recordkeeping
requirements").
19. Illinois State Bar Assoc. Advisory Op. on Prof Conduct Op. No. 96-10 (1997).
20. S.C. Ethics Advisory Op. 97-08 (1997) (citations omitted).
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Obviously, these conclusions presume that the firm has taken reasonable
steps to protect the integrity and security of its LAN, 2 particularly if the
LAN is connected to the Internet.22 These bar opinions do not appear to be
controversial, or much disputed. Lawyers can send e-mail on private LANs
without violating the duty of confidentiality.
B. Direct Computer-Computer Transmissions
1. The Risk of Eavesdropping
It is old hat for lawyers to send and receive confidential information by
digital communication over phone lines. Faxes are one example of such
computer-to-computer digital communications. Although a misdirected fax
may lose its privilege, no one argues that the use of a fax machine or the
possibility of misdirection precludes asserting privilege, or has any bearing
on confidentiality whatsoever.23
E-mail can also be sent directly over land-based phone lines, from one
computer to another.24 When e-mail is sent this way, it is no different than
sending a fax. The fact that the lawyer and the client are communicating
digitally rather than by voice does not increase the risk. Thus, unless one
is willing to say that using a land-based phone line is unreasonable, it is
reasonable to use e-mail over direct dial-up connections.

21. Obviously, reasonable security measures must still be used. For example, allowing
computers which sit in common areas to be unmanned for long periods of time, and without
password protection, could allow third parties to review stored communications or e-mail. But that
risk is distinct from the risk of transmission itself.
22. See generally Ariz. B. Ass'n Eth. Op. 04-05 (2005) (noting that lawyers who store client
confidences on computers which are connected to the Internet must take reasonable precautions to
protect against inadvertent or deliberate loss of confidentiality).
23. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility Formal Ops. 94-382 (1994) & 92368 (1992) (indicating that faxes can lose privilege if misdirected). Courts "seem to have taken it
for granted" that fax machines may be used to transmit confidential information without violating
any ethical rule. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual of Professional Conduct § 55:401, at 403 (1996).
24. We doubt anyone does this any more, but in law school in the mid-1980s my best friend
and I used modems to connect our computers together over phone lines to communicate. That is
what this section is about, and in effect it is no different than facsimile machines. The "modem"
analog to this sort of computer-to-computer is the "virtual private network," which is discussed
below.
25. Arguably, there is less risk since the person who conducts the wiretap would have to be
ready, not just to listen in to an oral conversation, but to intercept a digital communication.
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2. Legal Protections
In order to intercept a direct computer-to-computer communication, the
eavesdropper would have to place a wiretap on the phone line. This is
criminal behavior.26
3. Ethical Authorities
The bar associations recognize that e-mail sent over phone lines is
secure.27 No one seems to dispute that conclusion.
C. Internet Communications
In order to assess the risks associated with transmitting unencrypted email over the Internet, some background is necessary. When e-mail is sent
over the Internet, the risk of eavesdropping is greater than when e-mail is
sent over LAN-based or direct computer-to-computer transmissions. This
section explains why. Along the way, it also addresses some common
misperceptions about e-mail transmission.
E-mail, when sent over the Internet, does not go directly from the
sender's computer to the recipient's computer. Instead, once an e-mail
leaves the sender's computer, it typically is sent to the sender's router,
which has a connection to the Internet. 28 The Internet consists of thousands
of separate networks, each connected to each other by routers.29 Between
routers are fiber optic cable and other physical media.3" These separate
networks, connected together by their routers, make up the Internet.

26. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2002).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 113-31.
28. GRALLA, supranote 15, at 90-91.
29. Many different router manufacturers exist, including Cisco Systems, Inc., 3Corn, Alcatel,
Nortel, Siemens AG, and others. In order to simplify this discussion, we generically refer to
"routers." Here, "router" is meant to include hardware devices that operate on the "network" layer,
layer 3, of the OSI model at point-of-presence gateways. Significantly, "routers" are responsible
for forwarding data packets to other routers.
30. See STEVE MCQUERRY, CCNA SELF-STUDY: INTRODUCTION TO Cisco NETWORKING
TECHNOLOGIES 640-821 (Cisco Press 2004).
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The sender's router uses a transmission protocol, typically TCP/IP,3
to break the e-mail (and any attachments) into "packets" of no more than
about 1500 bytes.32 Each packet is given a "header" identifying its
destination, much like an address on an envelope.33 Each packet is then
sent out from the router on to the Internet.
The Internet is a web: often there is more than one route available
between two points. More importantly, the path any given e-mail takes
between two points may not always be the same. Each packet can take a
different path from sender to recipient because most routers on the Internet
use dynamic packet routing.34 Each router's best available path to the
destination router may change with every routing table update, based on
network congestion, router downtime, or any other number of factors.
Depending on which routing protocol 35 any given router uses, these
updates will typically take place every thirty to ninety seconds on each
router. Considering the incalculable number of routers that make up the
Internet, and consequently the possible routes, complete route updates for
any given packet probably occur multiple times within a single second.36
31. Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, a transport/network layer protocol used
to encapsulate data from upper-level protocols, such as SMTP. SMTP, or Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol, is an application layer protocol used to transfer e-mail that can only travel over the
Internet inside of TCP/IP packets. For more information on the OSI Reference Model, Protocol
Data Units, and data encapsulation, see Cisco, Internet Protocols, http://www.cisco.com/univercd/
cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito-doc/ip.htm; Cisco, IP Routing, TCP/IP Overview, http://www.cisco.
com/en/US/tech/tk365/technologies-white_paperO9186a008014f~a9.shtml. See also SMTP
Definition, http://searchexchange.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid43_ gci214219,00.html (last
visited Oct. 4, 2005).
32. See Curt Franklin, What is a Packet?, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/
question525.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Routing protocols are "protocols used by routers to make path determination choices and
to share those chioices with other routers." KURT HUDSON & KELLY CAUDLE, CCNA GUIDE TO
Cisco ROUTING, at 100-01 (Course Technology, Inc. 2000). Routing Protocols include Routing
Information Protocol (RIP), Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (IGRP), integrated IS-IS, Enhanced
Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP), Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP), and Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP). See generally ALEX ZININ, Cisco IP
ROUTING: PACKET FORWARDING AND INTRA-DOmAIN ROUTING PROTOCOLS, ROUTING AND
FORWARDING PROCESSES: DYNAMIC ROUTING (2002).

36.
According to the routing persistence results . . . approximately 10% of the
commercial Internet routes had lifetimes of a few hours or less. Moreover, their
cumulative distribution function for route lifetimes (based on sampling more than
36,000 host-pairs) was very flat across short time scales. Thus, since routing
update protocols are specifically designed to avoid synchronization in the update
times, and since the entire Internet contains a huge number of routers, we cannot
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Moreover, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
sponsored research in 2003 concluded that Internet path failures are not
"isolated to small set of locations (sic) but seems to be a general property
of Internet paths., 37 Path failures are more likely to occur between local
38
neighbor routers, making dynamic routing "particularly important.
Internet path failures contribute significantly to packet re-routing; there is
an inverse relationship between the frequency of path failures and the
constancy of packet routes.
In simpler terms, the sender's router is in contact with the routers
which are closest to it. Routers constantly update each other with network
conditions and adjust the paths that packets take in light of these changing
conditions. In between the routers, the e-mails are in transit in physical
communication lines, such as fiber optic cables.3 9
A single e-mail is broken into packets, and each packet may take a
different path through the Internet. Once all the packets are received by the
destination router, they are reassembled into the original message.4" Even
if the packets are received out of order, they are reassembled into a single
coherent original and then transmitted to the recipient's mailbox.4
Literature on Internet e-mail security has focused on the Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP).42 The focus on SMTP is misplaced. SMTP is

reject the possibility that the mean time between routing updates.., is below one
second.
Thomas Karagiannis et al., A NonstationaryPoisson View of Internet Traffic, 8 (2004), available
at http://www.caida.org/outreach/papers/2004/infocom (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
37. Nick Feamste et al., Measuringthe Effects of InternetPath Faults on Reactive Routing,
12 (2003), available at http://nms.lcs.nit.edu/papers/failures-sigm2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,

2005).
38. Path failures
are more likely to appear within an autonomous system than on the boundary, thus
making reactive routing techniques particularly important. 70% of the failures we
observe last less than 5 minutes, and 90% are shorter than 15 minutes... Overlay
networks can typically route around 50% of failures, independent of failure
duration. Overlay networks seem to be more effective at routing around failures
between hosts that have at least one large AS along the path.
Id.
39. See Nick Pidgeon, How Ethernet Works, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/
ethemet5.htm.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Harris, supra note 5, at 391 ("Long messages may be broken into "packets" which are
reassembled at each intermediate system through which the message passes as well as at their final
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a protocol within the TCP/IP suite. It is true that e-mail travels through
SMTP. However, SMTP is then segmented and packetized by TCP/ilP
before it ever exits the sender's router.43 Upon arrival, the recipient router
reassembles the TCP/IP packets, allowing the SMTP application layer
protocol to take over.
The actual functionality of SMTP mail relays seems to be
misunderstood as well. It is true that the SMTP mail relay protocol was
designed to store and forward messages indefinitely from server to server
until it reached the "delivery" mail server." However, with the advent of
open relay exploitation,4" the only legitimate SMTP mail relays originate
from the sender's remote client and only relay once to the sender's domain
("originating") SMTP server." SMTP servers which allow anonymous
relay are usually blacklisted in order to prevent the rampant spread of
spam mail. Some secured SMTP servers do allow other kinds of mail
relay, but the server administrator specifies IP addresses for receiving
relays.47 Arguably, this implies a trust relationship with the relaying client
mirroring that of an ISP/customer relationship.
Another common misconception is that the TCP/IP packets are
reassembled at each router in between the sender's router and the
recipient's router.4" As noted above, each packet from the sender's router
may take a different path to the recipient router. The routers in between do
not reassemble the entire e-mail.4 9 They simply process the packet they
destination."); United Statesv. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67,70 (1stCir. 2005) ("At various points the
packets are reassembled to form the original e-mail message, copied, and then repacketized for the
next leg of the journey.").
43. See supra note 29.
44. RFC 2821, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Obsoletes RFC 821), available at
http://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2821.txt (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
45. See John Leyden, Open Relay Spare is "Dying Out," REGISTER, (June 13, 2003),
available at http://www.it-analysis.com/article.php?articleid=10941 (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
46. Microsoft TechNet, Restrict Anonymous Access to SMTP, http://www.microsoft.com/
technet/prodtechnol/exchange/guides/StopEmailVirus/4486c8c 1-8d39-4c83-a8b4I facc411202e.mspx (2003).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 42.
49.
Routers do not reassemble IP datagrams from IP packets not destined for
themselves, for several reasons. First, it would add extra delays in routing: A
router would have to wait until all fragments of a given datagram came to it.
Second, the router would need to store all fragments of all datagrans before
reassembly... Third, and maybe most important, because routers perform load
sharing - sending packets to the same destination along parallel paths - and
because IP packets are sometimes dropped on their way through the network, a
router may never receive all fragments of a datagram.
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receive, momentarily storing the packet's header and trailer information
in the router's volatile RAM, and then forward or discard the packet
according to their individual routing tables.
With this background, the vulnerabilities of unencrypted e-mail can be
assessed. There are distinct places where e-mail passes through: the
sender's and recipient's gateway router, the physical media between the
routers, and the routers between the sender and recipient.
An Internet e-mail cannot be intercepted when it is traveling on
physical media between routers, such as fiber optic line, any easier than an
oral phone call, since it is essentially in the same physical pathway.
Accordingly, there is no reason to view the privacy of a digital Internet
message when traveling through such physical media any differently than
the transmission of a digitized facsimile or an oral telephone call. They are
all equally difficult to intercept while in transit. Therefore, the fact that email travels through the physical media that connects the routers does not
make it unreasonable to use e-mail unless, again, one is willing to say that
using telephones is unreasonable.
With respect to the sender's and recipient's ISPs, the same issues noted
below do arise: the lawyer must ensure that his ISP abides by strict
policies against monitoring e-mail, and he should consider advising his
client to confirm the same with respect to the client's ISP. So long as the
ISP is reasonably secure, the use of e-mail should be reasonably safe.
The critical difference between direct computer-to-computer
communications and e-mail that traverses the Internet is that Internet email does not go directly from the sender's computer over a land-based
line to the password-protected "mailbox" of the recipient." Instead,
Internet e-mail goes from the sender through intermediate routers, which
are owned by third parties, before reaching the recipient's mailbox.5 '
There are two potential "eavesdroppers." First, monitoring of e-mail by
network managers is permitted to a limited extent by the ECPA.52 Unlike
Zinin, supra note 35, at 41.
50. See Curt Franklin, How Routers Work, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/router.htm/
printable.
51. See GRALLA,supranote 15, at 31.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(I) (2002). This section, which applies equally to phone companies
and ISPs, provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication
service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property
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ISP owners, who as discussed below may have contractual obligations to
the owner of the e-mail account not to examine e-mail, routers are owned
by third parties without any contractual obligation of confidentiality to the
sender or recipient of the e-mail.
There can also be unauthorized eavesdropping by third-parties. The
principal vulnerability here comes from "sniffing." Sniffing in this context
means the surreptitious planting of software on a router to intercept e-mail
traveling through a router on its way to the recipient. The routers on which
packets travel very briefly hold the packets intended for another router
further down the line on the Internet, closer to the recipient.53 For example,
routers on the "backbone" of the Internet look at and move millions of
packets of information every second.54 Capturing this information as it is
going through these intermediate routers is called "sniffing." Sniffers use
software to search for unencrypted e-mail destined to or from certain hosts
and copy the message as it goes through the router.55
Packet sniffing on a router is infinitely more difficult than sniffing on
a LAN. First, remotely installing packet sniffers on a router requires a
much more sophisticated attack than LAN sniffing involves. Routers are
typically designed to run simple programs specific to routing. Their basic
program would not run a typical packet sniffing program.56 The sniffing
program would have to be loaded into a modified firmware program,
which sounds just as difficult to accomplish as it actually is.57 The router
would need to be hacked in order to load a modified firmware image. In
order to hack a router, one would need to run an RMON (Remote Network
Monitoring) probe, DSS (Distributed Sniffer System), a DoS (Denial of
Service) attack, or an extremely sophisticated GRE tunnel attack. All of
of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication
service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring
except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
53. See Franklin, supra note 51.
54. See id.
55. Cf. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (2005), with infra text accompanying notes
105-11.
56. Router firmware is generally stored in nonvolatile flash memory and router
configurations are stored in nonvolatile RAM. See generally Cisco lOS Command Line Interface
Tutorial, http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/710/lst/IOStutorial.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
Flash memory is also known as EEPROM (electrically programmable and erasable read-only
memory). Flash EEPROMs cannot be erased by bytes. They must be erased by the entire chip or
large sections of the chip. Jitu J. Makwana & Dr. Dieter K. Schroder, A Nonvolatile Memory
Overview (2004), http://aplawrence.com/Makwana/nonvolmem.html.
57. Flash memory has a finite number of erase-write cycles, so a router sniffer must be
designed to work within this limitation.
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these attacks can be prevented using basic system security and proper
configuration practices.58 Of course, no system is invulnerable to attacks,
and there have been successful runs of brute force attacks on routers.59
However, these types of attacks are vastly more sophisticated than
installing a simple LAN sniffing program on an end-user client.
Thus, the potential audience for eavesdropping of e-mail on the Internet
is made up of(1) those who are lawfully monitoring a router and (2) those
who gain unauthorized access, either due to lax physical security of the
router or, more likely, by way of using sniffer programs.
With that background on Internet e-mail structure and transmission, the
risks associated with transmission of different types of e-mail can be
assessed.
D. Virtual PrivateNetworks or SSL Communications
1. The Risk of Eavesdropping
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) are
different but are related means by which private Internet communications
can be ensured. As is discussed above, whenever any kind of information
- e-mail, web pages, or other files - is sent over the Internet, it is
transmitted through intermediate computers. It is possible for third parties
to view that information while passing through those intermediate
computers.
The combination use of VPN "tunnel"60 connections with encryption
and authentication protocol, such as SSL, prevents those who can capture
VPN packets from making any sense of them.6 ' A person viewing

58. Disabling unnecessary services, ingress and egress filtering, and other fairly simple router
configurations can severely disable or cripple most attacks on routers. See Improving Security on
Cisco Routers, at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies-tech note09186a
0080120f48.shtml; Security of the Internet, 15 FROEHucH/KENT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 231-55 (Marcel Dekker, Inc. 1997); see also CERT Coordination Center,
http://www.cert.org/.
59. See Mark Wolfgang, Exploiting Cisco Routers, http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/
1734 (2003).
60. "A tunnel is a logical structure that encapsulates the frame and data of one protocol inside
the Payload or Data field of another protocol. Thus, the encapsulated data frame may transit
through networks that it would otherwise not be capable of traversing." Cisco, Virtual Private
Networks (2004), http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito-doc/vpn.htm (2004).
61. See Stambler v. RSA Sec., Inc., 2003 WL 22749855 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2003); see
generally GREG HOLDEN, GUIDE TO NETWORK DEFENSE AND COUNTERMEASURES 295-308
(Thomson Course Technology 2003).
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information exchanged through an SSLIVPN connection would see
nothing coherent, because the data is scrambled.62 When used properly,
VPNs provide secure means of communication.
However, VPN technology requires that the law firm utilize special
enabling software, hardware, or both, and each technology has its own
special limitations. 63 For example, for SSL communications, firms must
acquire a certificate from an SSL certificate provider.' A client who visits
an SSL-enabled site can then send information securely. 65 There are other
limitations on SSL communications. Foremost, the client must sign on to
the firm's site to communicate. The client cannot simply use her normal
e-mail program to send a message to the lawyer. This is significant in
situations, where for example, one client must communicate with several
different law firms.
VPN, like SSL, uses public lines to transmit the communication.'
Unlike SSL, VPN allows for secure two-way communications. However,
VPN requires that both client and lawyer utilize special software.6 7
2. The Legal Protections
The same legal issues concerning e-mail discussed below apply to SSL
or VPN communications, since they traverse the Internet. Because they are
so difficult to decipher even if they are intercepted, however, any lack of
legal protection is of little practical significance.
3. The Ethical Authorities
No opinions addressing whether it was ethical to communicate via SSL
or VPN systems were located. However, SSL and VPN are forms of
encrypted communication. Therefore, the fact that the bar opinions and
commentators consistently agree that, as shown below, encrypted e-mail
is secure ought to mean that SSL and VPN communications are, likewise,
secure.

62. HOLDEN, supra note 61.
63. See Matthew Syme & Philip Goldie, Optimizing Network Performance with Content
Switching: Server, Firewall and Cache Load Balancing, 60 (Pearson Education, Inc. 2004).
64. See How Does SSL Work?, http://www.ourshop.com/resources/ssl.html; Window
Security, Secure Socket Layer, http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/SecureSocket-Layer.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
65. Windows Security, Secure Socket Layer, at http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/
securesocketlayer.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
66. JeffTyson, How VirtualPrivateNetworksWork, at http://computer.howstuffworks.com/
vpn.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
67. See id.
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E. Password-ProtectedCommunicationsSent Outside the
LAN, and with SSL or VPN Systems, Then Within One OnLine Service Provider
Although it sounds exotic, this section addresses a common means of
communication. Lawyers who subscribe to on-line service providers
(OSP), such as AOL, typically use a client that creates a proprietary IP
tunnel which encapsulates and encrypts packets sent between their
computer and AOL,6" and then send the message to a fellow AOL
subscriber. A person may use a computer to communicate over a direct,
land-based phone connection to that system. The person can transmit email from his own mailbox (access to which requires a password) to
another password-protected mailbox.
1. The Risk of Eavesdropping
There are several differences between LAN communication and
communications sent to and subsequently stored on an OSP.
The first difference relates to the way the information is transmitted. If
e-mail is transmitted to the OSP over the Internet without SSL or VPN
protection, then all of the issues discussed below concerning unencrypted
e-mail must be considered.69 However, ordinarily this is not the case.
Many ISPs build SSL or VPN into their communications interfaces, or the
connection is dial-up and over land-based phone lines.7" In the latter case,
the message is protected while in transit by encryption or tunneling
technology. That is the focus of this section; the use of unsecured
transmission is discussed below.
The second difference is where the information is stored. The practical
distinction between an OSP and a local area network (such as the law firm
LAN described above) is that any member of the public who pays a fee
can access an on-line service. An OSP is also subject to "hacking" by
nonpaying members of the public.
So long as the e-mail is sent over the Internet by an SSL secured VPN,
or dial-up connection, the differences with LAN and OSP e-mail arise

68. AOL Webmaster, Connectivity Info (2004), http://webmaster.info.aol.com/connectivity.
html; Leslie Ellis, AOL's Tunneling Conundrum (2000), http://www.translation-please.com/
2000/1113 aol tunneling.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 99-113.
70. Prior to the advent of broadband, one bar opinion noted that "these services transmit email messages from one subscriber's computer to another computer 'mailbox' over a proprietary
telephone network." Ill. St. B. Assn. Advisory Op. on Prof'l Conduct No. 96-10 (1997).
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from two facts: (1) the owner of the OSP no doubt can access e-mail stored
in its system and (2) because the OSP is connected to the Internet, the site
is in a sense a public site and so may be accessed by third parties, such as
"hackers" and the like.
2. The Legal Protections
With respect to OSP employee review of stored e-mail, there are two
sources of protection. First, an OSP employee who divulges an e-mail,
whether stored or in transmission, commits a crime. 7' In addition to
criminal laws, lawyers can ensure that the OSP - as with off-site file
storage facilities - has a policy in place that protects against review of email.7 2 Thus, the legal protection that makes off-site storage facilities
ethical to use can come from contract, not just criminal statute.73
It is important for a lawyer who is communicating with a client through
such a service to consider the system operator's policy toward e-mail: does
the system operator consider it to be confidential? AOL's policy toward
e-mail was, as of April 2005, as follows:
We do not use or disclose information about your individual visits
to AOL.com or information that you may give us on AOL.com,
such as your name, address, email address or telephone number, to
any outside companies. AOL.com may share such information in
response to legal process, such as a court order or subpoena, or in
special cases such as a physical threat to you or others. And, as we

71. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (1994) (making it a crime under the Stored Communications Act
for persons providing an electronic communication service to knowingly disclose the contents of
electronic communications stored by that service).
72. Generally, a lawyer may use off-site storage facilities operated by third-parties, provided
the lawyer is reasonably assured that the facility will take reasonable precautions to maintain
confidentiality. See N.C. Eth. Op. 209 (Jan. 12, 1996) ("[A] lawyer should store a client's file in
a secure location where client confidentiality can be maintained."); N.Y. Eth. Op. 643 (1993) ("We
also see no ethical impropriety in storing closed files ... so long as client confidences ... are
protected from unauthorized disclosure. The files should be stored in a secure location and should
be available only to the client, the client's present or former lawyer, or another with the client's
informed consent.") (citation omitted); Mich. Eth. OP. RI-100 (1991) (lawyer may "[s]tore client
representation files and other law firm files which are not to be destroyed in a facility which
protects client confidences and secrets, safekeeps property, and complies with recordkeeping
requirements"). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398
(1995) (discussing access of non-lawyers to a lawyer's internal database).
73. There may be no Fourth Amendment protection for e-mail stored with an ISP without
these safeguards. See Solove, supra note 1, at 20 (explaining that where third-party ISP employees
have access to data, it may not be protected by the Fourth Amendment).
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mention above, we may share with our Web site partners
aggregated statistical "ratings" information about the use of
AOL.com.74
AOL's agreement with its subscribers treats e-mail with essentially the
same degree of confidentiality required of lawyers. This policy would
probably be acceptable if it were part of an agreement made between a
lawyer and an off-site storage facility.75
In addition, while an on-line ISP could, theoretically, read every single
message sent within its system, it is unlawful to do so. Under federal law,
a provider of electronic communication services may intercept messages
only if it is "in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to
the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service
. . . ."76 More critically, if the fact that some monitoring is lawful precludes
information from being confidential, then telephone conversations over
land-based phone lines are not confidential, because telephone companies
are expressly authorized to monitor telephone calls."
With respect to third party access, information stored in password
protected e-mail accounts is protected by the Fourth Amendment. As the
U.S. Supreme Court stated,
"[f]or the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.78
Accordingly, courts have held that e-mail stored on AOL was subject to
a reasonable expectation of privacy. One such court stated:
[A]ppellant clearly had an objective expectation of privacy in those
messages stored in computers which he alone could retrieve
through the use of his own assigned password. Similarly, he had an

74. AOL Privacy Policy (2005), availableat http://site.aol.com/info/privacy.adp (last visited
Oct. 4, 2005).
75.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).

76. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2005).
77. See id. (declaring it lawful for a telephone company to monitor telephone calls in the
normal course of business).
78. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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objective expectation of privacy with regard to messages he
transmitted electronically to other subscribers of the service who
also had individually assigned passwords.79
Obviously, the Fourth Amendment applies only to governmental actors,
and so this principle simply means that the information is protected from
warrantless search and seizure. 0 However, the fact that information
protected by a password has been deemed to carry with it an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy suggests that the use of such technology
is "reasonable" under Model Rule 1.6.
Even putting the Fourth Amendment aside, unauthorized access by
third parties to e-mail stored on an OSP is also a violation of federal law.
Specifically, the Stored Communications Act provides a cause of action
against any person who "intentionally accesses without authorization a
facility through which an electronic communication service is provided...
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.",8' E-mails that
have arrived from the Internet are clearly in "electronic storage."82 Thus,
third parties who intentionally access e-mail that is stored with an OSP
before it is read violate federal law.83

79. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
80. See United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1 st Cir. 1999) (holding that a warrantless police
search of the defendant's personal computer in his apartment was not justified under the plain view
doctrine and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that seizure of images of child pornography from defendant's computer
hard drive was not authorized by the warrant authorizing search for drug trafficking information);
Smith v. Indiana, 713 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a warrantless search and
seizure of the electronic contents of the defendant's cellular phone, which had been seized from the
defendant's car during an investigatory stop, was not justified under the plain view doctrine).
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2707(a) (2005). The Act exempts conduct "authorized ... by
the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service." Id. § 2701 (c)(1). Or,
"by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user." Id. §
2701(c)(2).
82. "[E]lectronic storage" means either "temporary, intermediate storage... incidental to...
electronic transmission," or "storage... for purposes of backup protection." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)
(2005).
83. See Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 745 (2004) (ISP employee knowingly
divulged customer's subscriber information, in violation of Electronic Communication Privacy Act
(ECPA), even if employee mistakenly believed that warrant produced by police for information was
valid, where employee was aware that ISP was electronic communication service provider, and that
customer's subscriber information related to his subscription and thus electronic communications).
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3. The Ethical Authorities
Arguably, electronic communications sent over land-based phone lines
or SSL encrypted and authenticated VPN connections and then wholly
within an external OSP should be considered confidential, provided the
OSP provides reasonable network access security. An OSP could meet this
requirement by preventing unauthorized access to e-mail accounts by
outsiders as well as a policy or agreement with its subscribers that its own
employees will not access subscriber e-mail accounts.84 As one bar
association wrote:
Typically, the computer mailboxes involved are passwordprotected. Because it is possible for dishonest or careless personnel
of the mail service provider to intercept or misdirect a message, this
form of electronic mail is arguably less secure than messages sent
over a private network. As a practical matter, however, any
ordinary telephone call may also be intercepted or misdirected by
dishonest or careless employees of the telephone service provider.
Again, this possibility has not compromised the reasonable
expectation of privacy of ordinary telephone users. The result
should be the same for electronic mail service subscribers.8 5
Nonetheless, an opinion from the North Carolina Bar Association
ostensibly concluded that e-mail is not secure when sent among OSP
subscribers.8 6 The opinion addressed the question of"[w]hat is a lawyer's
ethical obligation when using electronic mail to communicate confidential
client information?" 7 It reasoned:
E-mail is susceptible to interception by anyone who has access to
the computer network to which a lawyer "logs-on" and such
communications are rarely protected from interception by anything
other than a simple password. In using E-mail, or any other
technological means of communication that is not secure, the same

84. See Susan E. Davis, Copy, Paste, Send... Oops?, 17 CAL. LAWYER 53 (1997) ("E-mail
sent through proprietary e-mail systems (i.e., an intraoffice account such as MCI Mail; a big
commercial service, such as AOL or Prodigy; or a direct line between two computers) are safe,
because the e-mail stays in a closed loop").
85. Illinois State Bar Assn. Advisory Op. on Prof 1 Conduct No. 96-10 (1997).
86. See N.C. Proposed Op. RPC 215 (1995).
87. See id.
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precautions must be taken as are set forth in [including advising the
client of the risks it entails] above.88
The South Carolina Bar Association Ethics Advisory Committee also
analyzed whether a lawyer could provide legal advice over an "on-line
service" without violating the duty of confidentiality.89 That committee
reasoned:
the very nature of on-line services is such that the system operators
of the on-line service may gain access to all communications that
occur on the on-line service. Thus, the confidentiality requirements
of Rule 1.6 are implicated by any confidential communication
which occurs across electronic media, absent an express waiver by
the client ....
Thus, it is the opinion of the committee that unless certainty can be
obtained regarding the confidentiality of communications via
electronic media, that representation of a client, or communication
with a client, via electronic media, may violate Rule 1.6, absent an
express waiver by the client.9"
Both the North Carolina and South Carolina Bar committees assumed
that, by their "very nature," system operators of on-line services have
access to all communications that occur on-line. This assumption is false.
Certain OSPs agree not to monitor e-mail, as noted above. To the extent
that this assumption is false, the conclusion reached does not follow.
Finally, the implications of concluding that OSP use is unethical are
profound. For example, the Terms and Conditions of a FedEx USA Airbill
- regularly used by lawyers to transmit client confidences - provides:
"Right to Inspect: We may at our option open and inspect your packages
before or after you give them to us to deliver."'" If the fact that OSPs have
a limited right to lawfully monitor e-mail implicates confidentiality, then
surely FedEx's unfettered right to "monitor" means that a lawyer cannot
use FedEx, at least not without explaining the risks and alternatives to the
client and obtaining the client's informed consent. No practitioners do that.
Nor should they be required to do so.

88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
S.C. Bar Advisory Op. 94-27 (1995).
Id.
On file with the author.
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For the foregoing reasons, an e-mail sent within an OSP that can be
accessed only by the recipient with a password should be held to carry an
objective expectation of privacy. As a result, a lawyer who is a member of
an OSP that does not regularly read e-mail, can send a message to a client
who is also a member of that service over land-based phone lines or
VPN/SSL, without violating the duty of confidentiality.
V. E-MAIL SENT OVER THE INTERNET WITHOUT SSL OR
VPN CONNECTIONS
There are, broadly speaking, two ways e-mail can be sent over the
Internet between OSPs or ISPs: as plain text or in encrypted form.92 This
section analyzes both forms.
A. EncryptedInternet E-Mail
1. The Risk of Eavesdropping
Encryption is an electronic "lock-and-key" technology where the lock
and the key are made of numbers rather than steel.93 Encryption programs
apply an algorithm to scramble the message.94 The algorithm itself need
not be kept secret; rather, the algorithm allows the user to select an
individual "key," which provides the secrecy. The algorithm then uses the
key to encrypt the message. In this way, "[c]omputer-based encryption
transforms messages into a pattern of letters and numbers using algorithms
- mathematical functions that define how to encrypt (encode) and decrypt
(decipher) messages. 9 5 After the user sends the encrypted message, the
recipient applies the same algorithm to decrypt the message.
The underlying arithmetic and means of implementing this technology
are obviously complex. Nonetheless, software can implement encryption
very easily, requiring the user to push a button and enter a limited amount

92. Information sent by SSL or VPN connection is encrypted.
93. See generally Peter B. Bensinger, Jr., Can the Decrepit Encrypt, Paper Presented at the
ABA 22d National Conference on Professional Responsibility, Chi., Ill. (May 30, 1996); David P.
Vandagriff, Who's Been Reading Your Email?, 81 A.B.A. J. 98 (1995) (discussing encryption
technology); Symposium, Public Key Infrastructure, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 241, 241-514 (1998)
(devoting entire symposium edition to public key encryption issues).
94. Stewart A. Baker, Government Regulation ofEncryption Technology: FrequentlyAsked
Questions,452 PLUPAT 287, 290 (1996).
95. Anjali Singhal, The Piracy of Privacy?A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Key Escrow
Cryptography,7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 189, 190 (1996).
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of text. There are several encryption programs available for commercial
use.
Thus, at its simplest, messages are "locked" by the sender, making
them unreadable as they pass through the Internet. Until they are decrypted
by the intended recipient, who can then decode the message with a key in
the form of an electronic password, messages remain unreadable.
2. The Legal Protections
The same legal issues discussed below, concerning whether
unencrypted e-mail is protected while passing through a router, also apply
to encrypted e-mail. 96 As with SSL/VPN communications, however,
because encrypted messages are essentially impossible to read even if they
are intercepted, the ease of interception is of little practical import to
whether there is confidentiality. Intercepting an unreadable e-mail does not
vitiate confidentiality.
3. The Ethical Authorities
All of the authorities recognize encrypted e-mail is secure. 97
B. UnencryptedE-Mail
1. The Risk of Eavesdropping
As the discussion of how Internet e-mail is transmitted demonstrates,
e-mail sent over the Internet must pass through the ISP of the sender, the
physical media connecting the routers together and ultimately the ISP of
the recipient. Each of these risks needs to be assessed.
The ISP of the recipient and sender are obvious vulnerable points. The
potential for monitoring by third parties or by the ISP of the sender and
recipient means that precautions must be taken, particularly if the
messages will be stored in reassembled form. Passwords protect stored email from hackers, and confidentiality obligations of ISPs should preclude
monitoring by ISPs of both the accounts of sender and recipient.
Likewise, the potential for "sniffing" for unencrypted e-mail is the
same: it is possible to "sniff' for e-mail at routers and surreptitiously learn
information in that fashion. Because unencrypted e-mail is sent in plain
text, a hacker who intercepts a complete e-mail passing through a router

96. See infra text accompanying notes 104-12.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 112-30.
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could potentially reassemble the packets and access the e-mail in an
intelligible format.
What kind of "reception" can these potential eavesdroppers get?
Reception is, at best, poor. In addition, even when interception is
successful, the realities are that often no benefit can accrue to a sniffer
because of the obligations of opposing counsel not to misuse an
opponent's confidences. Finally, the real-world observable evidence
suggests that interception is not occurring.
First, because of the structure of the Internet, sniffing often will result
at best in intermittent "reception" by the eavesdropper. The dynamic
routing of packets means, first, that not all or even a single e-mail may be
processed by a given router (with the exception of the sender's and
recipient's gateway routers), and, second, that separate e-mails sent over
time between attorney and client are not guaranteed to follow the same
path.98 Furthermore, frequent path failure and on-the-second route updates
create severe difficulty in predicting constant packet paths.9 9 There is no
guarantee, therefore, either that someone attempting to monitor an
intermediate router for e-mail between two specific people would see a
single packet of a message, or that even if a message between two people
was intercepted, that an entire message would be seen.
In addition, e-mail travels very quickly. Messages pass through routers
in micro-seconds. A packet is typically not present in the router for more
than a few microseconds. 0 Absent a pre-planned, sustained effort by a
hacker, coupled with the failure of a router administrator to police against
sniffing, sniffing is not likely to pick up much information.'
The amount of e-mail also serves as a form of protection. The sheer
volume of e-mail traffic is incomprehensible. E-mail volume is expected
to rise from 2 trillion messages in 2005 to 2.7 trillion by 2007.102 It would
seem likely that any individual who reviewed one isolated e-mail would
have a very difficult time putting that information to much mischief,
absent unusual circumstances such as a deliberate and sustained effort to
obtain the lawyer's e-mail.
Therefore, those monitoring a router would have difficulty
eavesdropping on particular messages without actually preparing to do so

98. Franklin, supranote 51 ("Your e-mail flows over any one ofthousands ofdifferent routes
to get from one computer to another.")
99. See supra text accompanying notes 28-59.
100. Franklin, supra note 98.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 28-59.
102. David Hallerman, Email: Turning up the Volume, at http://www.imediaconnection.com/
content/5630.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
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ahead of time. In light of all of these facts and the shear volume of Internet
e-mail, absent a deliberate and sustained attempt to intercept a lawyer's
messages, misuse of Internet e-mail will be difficult.
Real world data confirms that sniffing is not something to worry about.
As yet, there is no reported case involving sniffing of e-mail by third
parties by placing the e-mail on routers. The major insurance companies
have advised us that, at present, no claim has been made based upon the
interception of an e-mail.
There are perhaps some common sense reasons explaining why sniffing
for lawyer-client e-mail does not seem to be occurring. If the goal is
making money, there are much easier things to sniff for - credit card
numbers being the most obvious. Likewise, a hacker who successfully
intercepts an attorney-client e-mail is not likely to be in a position to put
the information to much use. For example, were a hacker to intercept an
e-mail of a draft brief, most likely the only person to whom that
information would be useful would be opposing counsel. Additionally,
opposing counsel who receive confidential information of an opponent
from an unauthorized source are required in many states to avoid using the
information.103
Obviously, there are exceptions. Some attorney-client e-mail might be
commercially valuable, such as an e-mail disclosing the fact that a
company intends to launch a takeover. Nevertheless, the point here is not
that some e-mail might be valuable to a hacker. Rather, the point is that on

103. See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof' Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994) (where
a lawyer receives confidences from an obviously unauthorized source, he must limit review of the
material and advise opposing counsel of receipt); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D.
La. 1992) (lawyer given confidential documents by employee of opposing party may not use them
but must notify opposing counsel), amended and reconsideredon othergrounds, 144 F.R.D. 73
(E.D. La. 1992). Somewhat similarly, a "lawyer who receives a document relating to the
representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b).
A comment to the rule explains that a lawyer who knows or reasonably should know that a
document was sent inadvertently should "promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person
to take protective measures." The comments also specifically state that the rule covers inadvertently
sent e-mail. Id. cmt. 2. Ethics opinions in many states also impose duties upon lawyers who receive
inadvertently transmitted documents from another lawyer. See, e.g., N.Y. City B. Ass'n Comm. on
Prof 1 & Jud. Ethics Op. 2003-04 (2004) (concluding that a lawyer who receives misdirected
documents must, if it contains "confidences" or "secrets," advise the sender of the mistake, unless
the lawyer has a good faith belief that a tribunal before which a dispute is pending will conclude
confidentiality has been waived); see also N.Y. County L. Ass'n Eth. Comm. Op. 730 (lawyer
should assist in preserving confidences of sender of inadvertently privileged documents); ABA
Comm. On Ethics and Prof I Responsiblity, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) (recipient of misdirected
communication should advise sender of the mistake and abide by its instructions).
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the whole, attorney-client e-mail does not appear to be a rich source of
quick money to hackers. Therefore, sniffing for this type of e-mail is not
likely to occur with much, if any, frequency. It is also consistent with the
fact that no incident of lawyer-client e-mail interception has been reported,
despite the trillions of lawyer-client e-mails that have been transmitted
over the Internet without encryption.
For all these reasons, Internet e-mail is subject to interception while in
transit. However the realities of the transmission process, the content of email, and the ethical constraints on opposing counsel all point to the
conclusion that it is reasonably secure.
2. The Legal Protections
E-mail sent through the Internet passes through three distinct areas: the
sender's and recipient's ISPs, the physical media, and the intermediate
routers. Each area must be analyzed separately.
As noted above, e-mail stored by an ISP is protected by law.l°4 When
an e-mail is transiting wires, fiber optic cable, or cable TV wiring, it is
illegal to intercept." 5
The issue of whether e-mail transiting a router is protected by the
ECPA is an issue that has caused considerable debate. In late 2004, the
First Circuit issued a panel decision, United States v. Councilman,10 6 in
which a two-judge majority reasoned that the ECPA did not apply to email while it was "on" a router, because at that time it was "stored" and
therefore not "intercepted."'0 7
l The facts are worth discussing,
The circuit court reversed en banc.08
since the circuit court did not precisely address the intermediate routers.
Councilman set up a domain name, "interloc.com," as a bookselling site.
He then sold e-mail addresses to other booksellers who wanted to use the
domain name. However, unbeknownst to them, he allegedly set up the email system so that copies of certain e-mails bound for his customers were
sent to him, so that he could gain a commercial advantage. Eventually, a
criminal proceeding was brought against Councilman for violation of the
ECPA.
In its en banc decision, the First Circuit rejected Councilman's
argument that the ECPA did not protect against interception of the e-mails.
104. See supratext accompanying notes 71-73.
105. See generally United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), vacatedon
othergrounds, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
106. Id. at 197.
107. See id.
108. See generally Councilman, 418 F.3d at 67.
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The Court reasoned that at the moment he copied them, they were "stored"
in the RAM or hard drives of his e-mail system, while en route to the
mailboxes of the recipients. Specifically, the court interpreted the ECPA
to apply to e-mail while it is passing through "transient electronic storage
that is intrinsic to the communication process for such
communications."'09
Given that the passage of e-mail through routers is "intrinsic to the
communications process for" e-mail, the interception of e-mail while
passing through a router would violate the ECPA. All of the ethical
authorities that support the use of unencrypted e-mail are based, in part, on
the premise established in the articles printed eight years ago:" 0 that
interception of e-mail sent over the Internet violates the ECPA. This is the
issue that Councilman essentially addressed,"' and this is the conclusion
that it essentially confirmed. Therefore, the importance of Councilman to
these decisions is worth noting. Again, however, illegality is but one part
of the equation: practical difficulty is the other.
3. The Ethical Authorities
a. The Early Opinions
Not surprisingly, the early ethics opinions on the issue of whether
lawyers may ethically use unencrypted e-mail reached conflicting results.
The first two opinions to address Internet e-mail reasoned that
transmission of unencrypted Internet e-mail violated the lawyer's duty to
safeguard client confidences and therefore could be done only with client
consent.
In the earliest opinion, the Iowa Bar Association (Iowa Bar)
reconsidered an earlier opinion" 2 and altered its original conclusion
regarding the use of the Internet in some measure, but still found that
unencrypted e-mail should not be sent over the Internet. The Iowa Bar had
been asked to delete the requirement in its earlier opinion "that sensitive
material be encrypted in communications between lawyer and client"
because, opponents argued, "the Internet provides no greater risk than
talking 'over a wire' or using Federal Express.""' 3 The Iowa Bar disagreed,
stating, "[w]hether or not it is no more risky than another medium is not

109. Id. at 79.

110.
111.
112.
113.

See supranote 2.
Liebesman, supra note 6, at 909.
Iowa Bar Association Formal Op. 95-30 (1996).
Iowa Bar Association Formal Op. 96-1 (1996).
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the question. The question is whether it is risky, and how risky, and at the
very best, at this time, this is less than certain." '14 However, the Iowa Bar
modified its earlier opinion slightly, stating:
Pure inter-exchange of information or legal communication with
clients is an exception to the Division I of this opinion, but with
sensitive material to be transmitted on E-mail counsel must have
written acknowledgment by client of risk of violation of DR 4-101
which acknowledgment includes consent for communication
thereof on the Internet or non-secure intranet or other forms of
proprietary networks, or it must be encrypted or protected by
passwords /firewall or other generally accepted equivalent security
system."'
The factual bases relied upon by the Iowa Bar are, upon close analysis,
not at all probative of the issue of e-mail confidentiality. The Iowa Bar
relied on a statement that, unless encrypted, e-mail can be read by the
router operators." 6 This is indisputable, but it is equally indisputable that
switchboard operators and phone companies can listen to phone calls to
precisely the same extent, as noted above. If the mere possibility of
disclosure to third parties makes written client consent a prerequisite to use
of the technology, then lawyers need client consent to use a land-based
phone line.
Furthermore, the Iowa Bar Association relied on the fact that neither
Visa nor Mastercard currently believed that there was the ability to verify
that a person transmitting a credit card number over the Internet was, in
fact, an authorized user of that card."' This fact has nothing to do with the
confidentiality of the transmission, but instead with the verification of the
content of the message and identity of the sender.
The assumptions underlying the Iowa Bar opinion are also worth
noting. First, the opinion presumes unlawful conduct by the operator in
that it presumes the operator will review all information on the router,
rather than to the limited extent authorized by the ECPA." 8 Second,
although Internet e-mail is subject to review by those who operate the
computers, as a part of ordinary monitoring or maintenance, the very same
statute permits monitoring of traditional telephone calls. No case has held

114. Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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that this monitoring operates to deny a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality. "9 Third, the opinion ignores the difficulty that exists in
intercepting a specific Internet e-mail message while it is being transmitted
through a router, as discussed above. Moreover, e-mail is transmitted in
20
separate packets, making it even less likely that misuse could occur.1
Frequent path failures compromise the constancy of any route. This
diminishes the probability of an entire e-mail packet flow transiting
through any single intermediary router, much less any related
communications following the initial packet stream. Any attempt to
quantify the probability of route constancy would require selecting the
correct abstract Internet topology theory and accompanying algorithm. The
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) 121 is better
suited to this task than attorneys and judges are. Route constancy
probability is as abstract as chaos theory, and just as fruitful for realistic
discussions of interception vulnerability. The better approach to this
problem is simple recognition of the fact that frequent path disruptions
undermine the reliability of any router interception scheme.
The position of the Iowa Bar would also lead to startling results if
applied in legally indistinguishable circumstances. Foremost, a lawyer
would have to advise a client that a land-based phone call may not be
confidential (due to monitoring), and a lawyer could not send or receive
a facsimile from a hotel front desk without risking breach of the duty of
confidentiality - even though the Internet operator, unlike the hotel
owner, would face criminal liability for disclosing the e-mail.
As a result of these flaws, opinions soon were issued which disagreed
with the Iowa Bar. 122 For example, the Arizona Bar Association's opinion
stated that "it is not unethical to communicate with a client via e-mail even
if the e-mail is not encrypted; this Committee simply suggests that it is
preferable to protect attorney/client communications to the extent it is
practical.' 23 Similarly, in response to "various inquiries regarding ethical
issues raised by use of electronic means of communication, including
electronic mail and the 'Internet,' by lawyers,' 24 the Illinois Bar explained

119. We found no case even rejecting the argument, which says a lot about its weakness.
120. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121. See CAIDA Web Site, http://www.caida.org/home (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
122. See Pennsylvania Op. 97-130 (1997); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-2 (1998); North
Dakota St. B. Ass'n Ethics Comm. 97-09 (1997); State Bar of Arizona Advisory Op. No. 97-04
(1997); Illinois State Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. on Prof I Conduct No. 96-10 (1997) [hereinafter I11.
Bar Ass'n 96-10].
123. State Bar of Arizona Advisory Op. 97-04 (1997).
124. Ill. BarAss'n 96-10.
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at length why it rejected the conclusions of the South Carolina and Iowa
bars:
Rather than moving directly from the sender's host computer to the
recipient's host computer, Internet messages are usually broken into
separate "packets" of data that are transmitted individually and reassembled into a complete message at the recipient's host
computer. Along the way, the packets travel through, and may be
stored temporarily in, one or more other computers (called
"routers") operated by third parties (usually called an "internet
service provider" or "ISP") that helps distribute electronic mail over
the Internet .... To intercept an Internet communication while it is
in transit over telephone lines requires an illegal wiretap .... The
Committee does not believe that the opportunity for illegal
interception by personnel of an ISP makes it unreasonable to expect
privacy of the message.' 25
In another early opinion, the Vermont Bar Association followed the
Illinois opinion and likewise approved the use of unencrypted Internet email, reasoning:
[A]II three types of electronic messages (local network, public
network, or Internet) appear no less secure than the ordinary fax or
telephone communication. For example, e-mail on a local or public
network can be accessed only from within the group which owns
the network.... Undeniably, e-mail sent over public networks and
BBS's is potentially less secure than mail sent over a private
network because the employees of the public network or an outside
person who "cracks" or breaks into the system could intercept the
message, but any phone call can be tapped, legally or otherwise,
and the mails and faxes can be intercepted and read. Since this
possibility of interception also exists for fax transmission and
regular mail, no reason exists to treat e-mail differently .... To
intercept an internet transmission in transit would constitute an
illegal wire tap.126
In light of these opinions, the South Carolina Bar then re-examined its
conclusion that a lawyer could communicate with a client by unencrypted

125. Id.
126. Vermont Bar Ass'n Advisory Ethics Op. 97-5 (1997).
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e-mail only with "an express waiver by the client."' 27 The June 1997
opinion concluded that "[t]here exists a reasonable expectation of privacy
when sending confidential information through electronic mail (whether
direct link, service, or Internet). Use of electronic mail will not affect the
confidentiality of client communications under South Carolina Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6. ' 28 The South Carolina Bar explained the
reasons for the change in its conclusion by noting that "[s]ince Opinion 9427 was issued, the use of e-mail has become commonplace, and there now
exists a reasonable level of 'certainty' and expectation that such
communications may be regarded as confidential, created by
improvements in technology and changes in the law.' ' 129 With respect to
unencrytped Internet e-mail, the opinion reasoned:
Likewise, e-mail transmissions via commercial networks or the
Internet maintain confidentiality ....The Committee concludes,
therefore, that communication via e-mail [maintains] a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Because the expectation is no less
reasonable than the expectation of privacy associated with regular
mail, facsimile transmissions, or land-based telephone calls and
because the interception of e-mail is now illegal under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2701(a)
and 2702(a), use of e-mail is proper under Rule 1.6.
The Committee notes that a finding of confidentiality and privilege
of such should not end the analysis. An attorney owes a client a
duty of reasonable care in keeping information confidential ....
A
lawyer should discuss with a client such options as encryption in
order to safeguard against even inadvertent disclosure of sensitive
or privileged information when using e-mail. 30
b. The State of the Law Today
The ABA and many states have issued ethics opinions which generally
provide that the use of unencrypted e-mail does not, at least in the abstract,
violate the duty of confidentiality despite the risk of third-party
interception. However, each opinion also warns that under some
circumstances plain text e-mail may violate the duty of confidentiality and,

127.
128.
129.
130.

S.C. Advisory Op. 97-08 (1997).
Id. (quoting S.C. Advisory Opinion 94-27).
Id. at 740.
Id. (citations omitted).
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in addition, most require or at least recommend lawyers to consult with the
client concerning the use of unencrypted e-mail, or prohibit its use where
"sensitive" information is transmitted. Those opinions are:
American Bar Association Formal Op. 99-413 (concluding that
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy over unencrypted email but the lawyer should consult with the client and follow its
instructions with respect to highly sensitive information).
Alaska B. Ass'n Eth. Comm. Op. No. 98-2 (Jan. 16, 1998)
(concluding that a lawyer may use unencrypted e-mail to
communicate on "all topics" but admonishing attorneys to "use
good judgment and discretion with respect to the sensitivity and
confidentiality" of information and advising, but not requiring, that
the lawyer caution the client of the risks).
Arizona Eth. Op. 97-04 (Apr. 7, 1997) (stating that "maybe" it is
ethical to use unencrypted e-mail, and suggesting that lawyers at
least advise clients of the risks).
Connecticut B. Ass'n. Informal Op. 99-52 (concluding that
"ordinarily" lawyers may use unencrypted e-mail, but require the
lawyer to consult with the client to ensure the client is familiar with
the risks it poses and "use good judgment and discretion" in
choosing modes of communication).
Delaware St. B. Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics Op. 2001-2 (2001)
(concluding that client consent is unnecessary and that lawyers may
use unencrypted e-mail "absent extraordinary circumstances").
District of Columbia B. Ass'n. Op. 281 (Feb. 18, 1998) (concluding
that unencrypted e-mail may be used, even absent consent).
Florida Eth. Op. 00-4 (July 15, 2000) (stating that sending
unencrypted e-mail "under normal circumstances" is not improper,
but stating that an attorney "should consult with the client and
follow the client's instructions before transmitting highly sensitive
information by e-mail").
Illinois St. B. Ass'n. Advisory Op. on Prof 1 Conduct No. 96-10
(May 16, 1997) (stating that encryption is not required, and neither
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is client consent, absent "extraordinarily sensitive matters" of a
kind that even telephones would be deemed inadequately secure).
Iowa B. Ass'n. Op. 97-1 (1997) (rescinding earlier opinion
requiring written permission to use unencrypted e-mail, and instead
requiring written acknowledgement to use unencrypted e-mail).
Minnesota Lawyers Prof I Resp. Bd. Op. No. 19 (Jan. 22, 1999)
(concluding that encryption was not required because absolute
security is not required).
New York St. B. Eth. Op. 709 (1998) (concluding that "in ordinary
circumstances" unencrypted e-mail may be used, but where a
particular e-mail is extraordinarily sensitive or is at a heightened
risk of interception, encryption must be used). See also City of N.Y.
Comm. on Prof'1 & Jud. Eth. 2000-1 (Jan. 2000) (same); Ass'n. of
B. Of City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'1 & Jud. Eth. 1998-2 (Dec. 21
1998) (same).
North Carolina St. B. RPC 215 (July 21, 1995) (concluding that
unencrypted e-mail is not unethical, but that a lawyer must use
reasonable care and advise the client if using a means of
communication susceptible to interception).
North Dakota Ethics Op. 97-09 (1997) (concluding unencrypted email does not violate the duty of confidentiality absent "unusual
circumstances").
Ohio Bd. of Comm'r. on Grievance & Discipline Op. 99-2 (1999)
(concluding that unencrypted e-mail does not violate the duty of
confidentiality, but advising lawyers to "use his or her professional
judgment in choosing the appropriate method of each attorneyclient communication").
Pennsylvania B. Ass'n Comm. on Legal Eth. & Prof 1 Resp.
Informal Op. No. 97-130 (Sept. 26, 1997) (concluding that
unencrypted e-mail may be used, but only if the client consents to
it and the lawyer does not use e-mail to send information that could
be damaging to the client without consent).
South Carolina B. Op. No. 97-1 (1997) (reversing earlier position,
which required "certainty" that communication would not be
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intercepted, and instead concluding that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy over unencrypted e-mail, and so using it
does not violate the duty of confidentiality).
Tennessee Advisory Eth. Op. 98-A-650 (Nov. 1998) (unencrypted
e-mail is permitted only if the client has consented).
Utah St. B. Eth. Advisory Op. 00-0 1 (March 9, 2000) (concluding
that a lawyer may "in ordinary circumstances" use unencrypted email, but stating that if the information is "particularly sensitive,"
or if the lawyer "has reason to believe the risk of interception of the
communication is higher," the lawyer should use a more secure
means of communication, and that the lawyer "may wish to advise
the client at the time he is retained that the lawyer intends to use
unencrypted e-mail").
Thus, as of today, no bar association prohibits unencrypted e-mail, and
those that once did retracted their earlier positions.
VI. CONCLUSION: LAWYERS STILL WORRY Too MUCH

The conclusion that lawyers can confidently use unencrypted e-mail
rests upon two notions: that it is illegal to intercept, and that when the email is transiting the Internet, it is difficult to intercept. Councilman
addresses the first notion, and recognizes that intercepting e-mail while "in
transit," even if momentarily "stored," violates the ECPA. That should
provide some comfort for lawyers.
However, the legal component is only one part of the equation. Even
if interception is illegal, if it is easy to intercept messages, the law is of
cold comfort to clients and counsel. In this regard, focus on Judge Learned
Hand's seminal opinion in Hooper3 ' is appropriate. Judge Hand
recognized that merely because an industry had not generally adopted the
precaution of having radio receivers on board tugs so that the tugs could
receive weather reports the failure to do so could still constitute a breach
of duty.'32
Is encryption the radio on the tug boat? Not today. Will it be one
someday? Perhaps - if there are established risks and little legal
protection.

131. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
132. Id. at 740.
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There are real risks of communicating over the Internet -just as there
are real risks in using the phone, FedEx, computers, mail, or in engaging
in "private" office conversations. As of right now, it is reasonable to
believe that the nature of the Internet - the packetization, the random
routing, and the difficulty of effectively sniffing for messages - makes
the continued use by lawyers of unencrypted e-mail acceptable for all but
the most sensitive information. No empirical evidence suggests otherwise.
Therefore, lawyers should stop worrying and use Internet e-mail.

